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Abstract
Can we train a machine to detect if another machine has under-
stood a concept? In principle, this is possible by conducting tests
on the subject of that concept. However we want this procedure to be
done by avoiding direct questions. In other words, we would like to iso-
late the absolute meaning of an abstract idea by putting it into a class
of equivalence, hence without adopting straight definitions or showing
how this idea “works” in practice. We discuss the metaphysical im-
plications hidden in the above question, with the aim of providing a
plausible reference framework.
1 Preamble
In his famous tale, Las ruinas circolares ([3]), J. L. Borges depicts the efforts
of a man in his struggling endeavor to create, through his own dreams, a new
life. The accomplishment is to induce the dreamed subject to become an
independent virtual son, able to live a proper life disjointed from the dreams
of his creator. The story ends with the stunning discovery that the original
man is himself the “materialization” of the dreams of another entity.
The dreamer and the dreamed subject belong to different “realities”,
that in the Borges’ fiction end up to be both “virtual”. At a first glance,
there is no direct connection between these universes. If ours is somehow
the world of reality, the seemingly dissociated domain of our thoughts is
usually defined as intangible. One is tempted to attribute a superior level of
abstraction to the second environment, though this is not necessarily true,
according to the circularity of Borges’ arguments.
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2 Motivations
Modern programming instructs machines to learn according to apprehend-
ing processes that try to mimic those followed by humans. A recurrent
question is what an inanimate bunch of semiconductors may have under-
stood about the lessons imparted; that is: how a machine “visualizes” in its
own “mind” the product of new discoveries? Does it have knowledge of its
knowledge? Can other machines know about its thinking “just by looking in
its eyes”? These philosophical issues are akin to the thematic of automatic
self-consciousness ([6], [11]), a subject that will be rediscussed at the end of
section 5. An attempt to provide some answers is tried in these few pages.
It will be argued that abstract concepts do not follow from definitions or
by direct algorithms, but they might be ruled by the same mechanism that
allows to achieve “understanding” at the very first level.
3 Discussion
With the supervised help of a teacher, a child can refine the notion of color
(red, for instance) through examples, by learning how to construct and as-
sign a name to specific classes of equivalence. Some notions could be actually
innate (see, e.g., [5]), however, the individuals of a “society”, already aware
of those primary concepts, play a fundamental role in the instructing pro-
cess. By a similar training, a machine can recognize if there is a cat on a
table. Adding deeper and deeper layers of training, the same machine can
learn to recognize a black cat on a wooden table, lapping milk from a cup.
Despite the increasing complexity of the details, the above training sets be-
long to the space of reality, while the final result (i.e., the knowledge) looks,
in some way, more “abstract”. The last observation is indeed incorrect from
the technical viewpoint, since both the images of the cat and the “neural”
outcome of the brain of the instructed machine are represented by sequences
of the same type of bits. It is only our preconceived intuition of reality that
tends to assign different levels to these categories.
At this point, one may ask: how do we know if a child has clear in
mind the abstract idea of “red”? The exam is simply done by submitting
to his/her attention one or many objects, and pose questions about their
colors. Neglecting possible shades of randomness, this analysis is fast and
secure, since is exactly based on the same apparatus that generates the skill
of distinguishing colors.
Can we do the above check indirectly, thus without showing any object
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to the child? In some parts of the child’s brain the activation of a certain
concept (innate or acquired) has created suitable permanent connections.
The study of these new links may give an answer to our question without
relying on the practical experiment. In a very similar way, the machine’s
concept “cat on table” resides in a memory made of silicon-based circuitry,
under the form of a peculiar distribution of data. Interpreting these data
may teach us if (and maybe what) the machine has formally understood.
Unfortunately, reading a single computer’s memory and try to deduce
something is like acquiring the notion of red through the realization of just
one test. Therefore, it is advisable to play with a series of trained and un-
trained devices, in order to make comparisons and come to conclusions. The
path to be followed is the same inspiring the initial training procedure used
for reality. This will be “supervised” until the learning machine acquires
independence. Such an algorithm does not necessitate the submission of fur-
ther cats’ pictures. It is an analysis made at a different level, like the dream
that exists in a more profound layer with respect to that of the dreamer.
The commitment of the learning machine is to distinguish by comparisons
the devices that “know” from those that “do not know”, without studying
“what they actually know”. It has been already noticed however that all
the levels of abstraction are similar from the technical viewpoint. In truth,
following Borges, the dreamer himself is the product of the “imagination” of
another dreamer, and, in practice, we have no means to distinguish a dream
from a dream into a dream.
In other words, it would be possible to understand if a device has under-
stood something, through a procedure that does not require direct questions.
Since this construction is made with the help of another training history (at
upper level), we cannot mathematically define (not even a posteriori) what
kind of configuration must be actually present in a prescribed instructed
device to be tested. This is not surprising, because it is similar to our in-
capability of providing an absolute definition of red without indicating an
example. “Red” is a class of equivalence. In the same way, “have the knowl-
edge of red” is another class of equivalence; there is no official indication of
the elements of this class, but only examples of elements sharing the same
properties. Our mind is modified as we add new knowledge, however this
process is very subtle, so that we cannot practically put into words the de-
tails of these changes (to explain for instance in which area of our brain and
under what form those data are present).
The reliability of a set of CPUs, programmed to face AI problems, could
be in principle verified aseptically, i.e., by plugging electrical supply, but
avoiding the use of any peripherals. Here the purpose is not just the check
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of their plain functionality, but to test their supposed capability to apply
intelligence. For instance, this kind of training may teach a robot to make
a decision not only on the basis of what other robots do, but on what they
are thinking (if the data of their central systems are available). The in-
struments to carry out this analysis are standard, although applied to a
context that looks upgraded. As pointed out in a recent article ([12]), even
current codes for image understanding may fail when tested on appropriate
nasty examples. What may happen with abstract concepts is at this stage
unpredictable, since it is certainly not an easy task to predict what is the
percentage of trustworthiness of these outcomes, which are surely affected
by large error spreading. A long phase of experimentation is then neces-
sary. Since this dissertation is only finalized to the description of the basic
principles, we only provide a few guiding theoretical advices. Thus, we do
not discuss in this paper any concrete development process, leaving to the
experts the implementation of the instances here exposed.
4 Remarks
We proceed in this short disquisition with a warning. Trespassing the privacy
of an individual to know if he/she has well elaborated the concept of red,
without posing straight questions, could be a first step to surreptitiously
discriminate peoples on the base of political inclinations, sexual attitudes or
whatever an organ of control wants to know. It is worthwhile to recall once
again that here this kind of analysis is not directly constructed on specified
parameters, but to the belonging or not of the individual to classes already
constituted. The purpose of the machine is to classify an individual through
a characterizing history (websites visited, for example), without examining
substantial real facts, but rather the general activity in the framework of a
list of prejudged individuals presenting a well prescribed property.
Without a QI test, a person could be recorded as an “intelligent fellow”
because of his/her affinity to representatives initially present in that cate-
gory, with no explicit notion of the properties characterizing that class. In
fact, the setting up of the class itself is the result of a previous analysis car-
ried out on individuals declared “intelligent” or “not intelligent” in advance.
Thus, the decision is taken as a consequence of the “way to behave”, and not
on the capability of “acting intelligently” in the solution of a given problem;
this without the necessity of formalizing officially how an intelligent person
is expected to behave. It is evident that such a superstructure has ethical
implications, so that it must be used wisely.
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In terms of AI, the memory maps of a new machine are compared for
example with those belonging to the class of “intelligent machines” and
the response is made without further external checks. Note that clear traces
denoting “intelligence” could not be present in the preexisting data (actually,
we do not even know how these traces look like), indeed such files have been
just selected on the base of the claimed intelligence of the machines to which
they belong.
In this last paragraph the focus is concentrated on another crucial ob-
servation. It is possible to retain the idea of a specific color without naming
it. By the way, the reason why the word “red” is the name of the class of
all red colored objects, comes from the necessity of confronting each one’s
discoveries with other peoples (see at the beginning of section 3). The ab-
straction of the term is actually born in the moment it becomes a product
of the collectivity. Thus, the interpretation of a thought comes naturally as
a result of the comparison of many minds, as also punctuated before in this
paper.
5 Contextualization
The topics touched in this brief exposition are certainly not new ([10]). They
assume however a wider relevance in this specific moment, in which the field
of machine learning is experiencing a positive period of growth, both in appli-
cations and complexity. In a recent review paper ([9]), future developments
in the field of deep learning are addressed. Among the new disciplines, rein-
forcement learning is gaining popularity ([17]). There, a progressive tune up
of the policy is wisely applied to optimize the so-called return. For instance,
in [14] and [15], this type of training has been implemented without human
assisted supervision, and can represent a first attempt to guide a machine to
acquire self-knowledge. As pointed out several times in this paper, there is
a hidden difficulty in going ahead with this construction, i.e., the device will
not be conscious of its own understanding, until this “state” is shared with
other entities (I understand we both have understood, because we “feel” it
in the same way).
Efforts have been made in order to associate increasingly complex con-
cepts, with the help of always more sophisticated modules acting on data
and accomplishing upgraded tasks ([4]). In [13], the concern is to provide
a robot with sophisticated skills, in order to be able to recognize aspects
of the human behavior. This implementation, obtained by assembling spe-
cialized modules, is a prerogative of a single machine through a process of
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identification at various stages, similar, more or less, to what happens in
deep learning. The design requires strong human assistance to be initial-
ized, since the building process translates into machine language, the results
of the experiences commonly lived in reality. The goal is more similar to
the effort of creating a sort of human clone, rather than letting the machine
to develop a proper way of reasoning. The above mentioned approaches are
then quite different from the one here discussed, where “understanding” is
not viewed as a “complexification” of the bottom, but as a concentrate of
the experiences of a community, that can be extracted on the base of the
same principles ruling human connections with reality.
One may try to establish intersections between our proposal and the
so called Theory of Mind (ToM) (see e.g. [8], [2], [20]), which represents
an efficacious instrument of analysis in the sociological and psychological
contexts. In such a discipline, governed by empiricism, part of the effort
is concentrated on the study of the various stages of development, where
humans acquire knowledge and understanding, through a systematic process
named: “learning the Theory of Mind”. Again, the translation of these
achievements into the machine language seems to follow a path which is
different from what suggested here. In truth, we do not want to teach
anything to a computer or transfer our “vision” into it. Instead, the machine
has to learn its own ToM. For instance, a computer may autonomously
build the concept of wellness, after examining a series of peoples declared
by a supervisor to be joyful or sad (maybe because they laugh, cry, or
move their face in a bizarre manner). The results of this training are, in
general, not decipherable, as the machine in its own analysis could emphasize
aspects of the individuals that we do not even observe or imagine. At the
end of the process, we do not need to know the definition of “wellness”
apprehended by the machine. On the other hand, if we had a definition of
wellness, we could have directly imparted it into the machine from the very
beginning. The learning process is satisfactory if somehow (with a margin
of error) the machine has “understood” in its own way, and it is able to
operate accordingly. There is no need to care about the format of these
notions, if the machine can finally do the job, for which it has been trained,
in the proper way. At higher level, future machines could not necessitate
instructions from men, but they will talk, exchange information, and create
new cerebral connections that have nothing in common with those usually
developed in humans. By following this approach, in the technology of
tomorrow, no human could be in the position to understand what computers
actually have in mind.
Going into a more sophisticated area, a possible extension of these con-
6
siderations can be applied to the field of consciousness, though the approach
may be judged a bit risky (or naive). Consider the phrase: I know that I
am conscious because I can share this opinion with other peoples, and not
because I can universally define such a feeling. Again, following this path,
the term “self-knowledge” applied to an individual turns out to be an el-
ement of a class of equivalence; therefore, it should be studied within this
frame of reference. Thus, based on the material discussed in the present
paper, in order to be built, abstraction necessitates of both “reality” and
the (implicit or explicit) request of a community; hence it cannot be the
consequence of the direct experience of a singlet. We can make clear this
idea with an example. Let us suppose that a set of automata learn to play
chess and refine their capabilities by continuously challenging each other.
Will be they conscious of being chess players? The answer is no, from the
simple reason that there is no utility to develop such a knowledge, unless
the machines do “decide” together that there is the necessity to build the
class of “chess players”, with the purpose to distinguish their ability from
the state of other existing machines that do not even know the basic rules
of the game. Recognizing to be part of that class is an act of consciousness,
although one may argue that this notion is rather weak in comparison to
more advanced forms of awareness. The convenience to give origin to that
specific class, may be due to some (external) forms of gratification. To this
purpose, a device may be supplied with ad hoc registers aimed to classify
and publicly advertise, the current level of capabilities and a certain degree
of “satisfaction”. Thus, an isolated single element cannot become conscious
by itself, because, according to our view, such a problem is ill-posed. In
contrast to what has been just specified, current research in Artificial Con-
sciousness is aimed to extract definitions and characterizations in human
natural activities ([21], [19]) to be translated in computational models (see,
e.g., [1], [16], [7], as well as [11] for a throughout review of the major achieve-
ments). Obviously, these approaches follow the reverse path. In [18] we can
find the following statement: “consciousness corresponds to the capacity to
integrate information”. Though we are not moving here in the direction
indicated in that paper, we recognize a vague resemblance with some basic
concepts.
6 Conclusions
The rationalization process of mathematical type, described so far, involves
the classification of objects or abstract entities into classes of equivalence.
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We renounce however to give a definition to the elements of these classes,
though we know that each class contains elements of the same nature.
Classes can be associated with a name (a red hat belongs to both the classes
“red” and “hats”). However, names come after the construction of a class
and are used to communicate to other individuals that something has been
apprehended from nature and that such experiences are waiting to be shared.
This is different from assuming to have a name (hence, a characterization)
and collect together all the entities under that name. We cannot create the
notion of “good guy” from scratch, but we can recognize a good guy among
a multitude of fellows. This is because our mind, with observations and the
exchange of information, has generated the appropriate class of equivalence.
Classes can be generated at any level of abstraction and complexity. Regard-
ing the viability of these ideas, we are not able here to investigate further,
so that the turn now passes to the experts. We should however be careful,
when establishing parallels between our mind and the work of a machine.
Human beings went through a long process of evolution. Experiences of a
single life mix up with innate structures that are inherited from generations,
therefore these last aspects should not be underestimated.
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